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THE COST OF COAL: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE END OF COAL AS A SOURCE OF "CHEAP"
ELECTRICITY
Melissa Powers*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Coal is the dominant source of electric power in the United States,
providing nearly 50 percent of all electricity in the country.1 In
comparison, the other major sources of electricity – natural gas and nuclear
power – supply only about 20 percent each of the country’s electricity, and
renewable energy sources account for less than 10 percent.2 Until recently,
it appeared that coal would retain its superior position over these other
electricity sources, despite decades of environmental regulation aimed at
controlling the environmental harm caused by coal mining and combustion,
because coal remained the cheapest source of electricity.3 However, the
specter of climate change legislation may threaten coal’s supremacy. Coalpowered electricity is the largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions
* Assistant Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. The author thanks Kristen
Monsell (J.D. 2009) and Oday Salim (LL.M. 2009) for their excellent research assistance,
and the students of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for hosting an
excellent symposium and working with me on this piece.
1. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2008 228 fig.8.2a (2009),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See id. (showing coal use in electricity increasing consistently since 1949, while
natural gas and nuclear energy have seen small spikes in production that have ultimately
plateaued). See also John A. Sautter, Note, The Clean Development Mechanism in China:
Assessing the Tension Between Development and Curbing Anthropogenic Climate Change,
27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 92 (2009) (explaining that coal is cheap because it is abundant).
Many federal environmental laws regulate aspects of coal mining and combustion, including
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (2006), and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§
1201-1328 (2006). However, many commentators have argued that agencies do not
adequately apply these laws to coal. See, e.g., Reid Mullen, Note, Statutory Complexity
Disguises Agency Capture in Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 927 (2007)
(discussing inadequate regulation under the Clean Water Act); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
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in the United States,4 and coal has therefore become a primary target of
climate change legislation pending before Congress.5 As regulators
evaluate the potential costs of climate change regulation, they have begun
to reject coal as a cheap electricity source.6 If more regulators follow suit,
the energy system in the United States could profoundly change.
Traditional utility regulation has favored coal to provide abundant,
reliable, and above all, cheap electricity to utility consumers.7 Under
traditional utility regulation regimes, electric utilities receive permission to
operate as natural monopolies and, in exchange, they agree to provide
service to all customers within their service area and to earn revenues set
by public utility commissions (PUCs) under cost-of-service ratemaking
proceedings.8 Traditional cost-of-service ratemaking aims to achieve two
ostensibly competing goals.9 Ratemaking must provide the utility an
adequate rate of return that will enable it to retain its investors and attract
new ones, and ratemaking attempts to protect consumers from exploitative
rates.10 For decades, PUCs have embraced coal as an ideal electricity
source that enables PUCs to accomplish their paradoxical regulatory
objectives, because coal is both profitable for the industry and cheap for
consumers.11
Until very recently, it appeared that PUCs would continue to favor
coal as the ideal source of abundant, reliable, and cheap power.12 However,
in a handful of decisions issued since 2007, PUCs have rejected or
restricted utilities’ proposals to construct new coal-fired power plants.13 In
some cases, the PUCs referenced potential climate change legislation or
carbon costs as the justification for their decisions, noting that project costs
4. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
SINKS:
1990-2007
Annex
I
at
A-4
tbl.A-1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/Annex1.pdf.
5. See American Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(amending current regulatory policies to establish a combined efficiency and renewable
electricity standard that requires utilities to supply an increasing percentage of their demand
from energy efficiency savings and renewable energy and setting forth performance
standards for new coal-fired power plants).
6. See infra notes 135-196 and accompanying text.
7. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 73 (3d
ed. 2004) (noting producers reliant on fossil fuel are favored because they can realize
economies of scale).
8. Id. at 122-24.
9. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 93 (2d ed. 2006).
10. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring).
11. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7 at 223 (noting coal’s abundance).
12. See id. at 254 (predicting coal would maintain or increase its importance in the U.S.
energy portfolio).
13. See infra notes 135-196 and accompanying text.
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associated with climate change would make coal unduly expensive and
risky.14 Regulators have also resisted proposals for new “clean coal” plants
because the technology remains unproven and costs of “clean coal” could
be enormous.15 In these decisions, PUCs have no longer embraced coal as
an unambiguously reliable or cheap source of power.
The history of the nuclear power industry during the 1970s and
1980s sheds light on the regulators’ cautious approach to new coal plant
proposals. During the 1950s and 1960s, PUCs approved construction of
dozens of nuclear power plants in the United States.16 By the 1970s,
however, the nuclear industry imploded when electricity-use projections
proved wrong, plant construction costs skyrocketed, and the reactor at
Three Mile Island had a near-meltdown.17 As desire and demand for
nuclear power dissipated, utilities stopped building nuclear plants and
declined to bring completed plants into operation.18 When the utilities
sought to recover their costs from electricity ratepayers, PUCs faced hard
decisions and unhappy stakeholders. PUCs could pass on the costs to
ratepayers who never received any electricity; they could force the utilities’
investors to bear the costs of plants even though the PUCs had authorized
their construction; or PUCs could attempt to fairly allocate the costs
between ratepayers and utilities.19 No matter what choice they made, PUCs
could not reach a politically satisfactory result. Regulators’ reluctance to
allow new coal plants likely reflects their desire to avoid repeating the
mistakes made with nuclear plants.
The recent PUC decisions rejecting new coal plants reflect concerns
that future climate change legislation may drive up the costs of coal to the
point that it no longer represents a viable source of affordable energy. Cost
estimates of the climate change bill recently passed by the House of
Representatives20 predict that coal will lose its dominance over time as
climate change controls become more stringent.21 Even if Congress does
not enact climate change legislation in the near term, the uncertainty
associated with prospective regulation will likely alter regulators’ views of
coal. Having been burned during the ascendancy of the nuclear industry,
PUCs will proceed with particular caution before approving new facilities
14. See infra notes 135-169 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 170-196 and accompanying text.
16. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 275 tbl.9.1.
17. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
20. American Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
21. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R.
2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 26 (2009) [hereinafter
ENERGY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R. 2454] (projecting coal production and
consumption will decrease dramatically by 2030 under ACESA cap-and-trade program).
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that could be subject to carbon regulation. The threat of any law is enough
to keep PUCs cautious and to alter the dynamics in the electricity sector.
Regulators’ skepticism regarding the future of coal could help
transform the nation’s energy system whether or not Congress passes an
aggressive climate change bill. In the short term, utilities will likely turn to
natural gas.22 Over time, however, utilities will need to transition to other
energy sources to avoid price volatility.23 Although some scholars predict
that “clean coal” and nuclear energy will replace existing coal plants if
Congress passes climate change legislation,24 the recent coal plant denials
may signal a broader reluctance by PUCs to expose ratepayers to the
financial risks “clean coal” and nuclear facilities present. Regulators’
current doubts about coal may therefore prompt near-term investment in
renewable energy technologies and a longer-term switch away from coal,
natural gas, and even nuclear power. Under this alternative scenario,
traditional utility regulation, which typically eschews innovation and
uncertainty, may prove to be an important tool in making renewable energy
sources economically viable.
Part II of this article provides an overview of traditional utility
regulation and explains why traditional ratemaking has favored coal. Part
III describes the failure of the nuclear industry during the 1970s and 1980s
and explains how PUCs allocated the costs between ratepayers and utilities
for electricity they never received. Part IV explains why coal plants face
particular risks in a carbon-constrained world, introduces different coal
combustion technologies, and explains how these technologies present both
opportunities and limitations for the coal industry. Part V then describes
how PUCs have restricted or rejected utilities’ proposals to construct new
coal-fired power plants in an effort to protect ratepayers from avoidable
cost risks. Part VI concludes that the specter of climate change regulation
will irrevocably change PUCs’ attitudes toward coal. This, in turn, has the
potential to create more opportunities for renewable energy technologies
and to fundamentally alter the electricity system of the United States.

22. JOHN D. PODESTA & TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NATURAL GAS:
A
BRIDGE
FUEL
FOR
THE
21ST
CENTURY
(2009),
available
at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/naturalgasmemo.pdf (describing the
benefits of and opportunities for natural gas use).
23. Natural gas prices, like oil prices, also may be subject to unpredictable price swings.
See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765,
799 (2008) (“Natural gas prices are notoriously volatile, complicating the projection of
revenues for sellers on energy markets.”).
24. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from
Coal, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 211 (2009) (proposing legal strategies to promote
“clean coal”); Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 15 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L. J. 1, 13-14 (2007) (outlining the greater profitability of nuclear power plants in
comparison to natural-gas-fired plants).
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AN OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL UTILITY REGULATION

Shortly after Thomas Edison established the first central power
station in Manhattan in 1882, the electricity system in the United States
became dominated by vertically integrated investor-owned utilities
(IOUs).25 Vertically integrated utilities own and operate all three
components of the electricity system: generation of the electricity at power
plants, transmission of the electricity over high-voltage power lines, and
distribution of the electricity to end-users.26 For most of the 20th century,
vertically integrated utilities dominated the electricity sector, and even
today, despite the increase in independent power producers that generate
electricity to sell to utilities,27 vertically integrated IOUs continue to
produce nearly 40 percent of all electricity delivered in the United States.28
Vertical integration of electric utilities prompted regulators to treat
the electricity system as a natural monopoly.29
Under a typical
monopolistic system, a monopoly will initially lower its prices to drive out
competitors.30 Once all competitors have exited the market, the monopoly
will have unlimited power to increase prices and lower production to
maximize its profit.31 To prevent monopolistic behavior, regulators have
several possible responses.32 Most commonly, regulators will use antitrust
laws to “break up” the monopoly and restrict the monopoly’s behavior to
promote competition.33 However, in some circumstances, regulators will
determine that a particular industry will never be competitive and that
monopolies within that industry are inevitable.34 Where regulators
determine such natural monopolies exist, they will increase regulation over

25. Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 503-506 (2005).
26. See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 419 (2005) (describing vertical integration of utilities).
27. See id. at 424-25 (discussing increasing acceptance of competitive wholesale
market for electricity).
28. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Industry Generating Capacity by Type, 2007,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/figure3.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2009).
29. See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 506-07 (defining natural monopoly and
describing legal precedent that led to recognition of natural monopolies and subsequent
regulation).
30. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A
NUTSHELL 39-40 (4th ed. 1999).
31. Id. at 40 (“[T]he monopolist will maximize profits by restricting output and setting
price above marginal cost.”).
32. Id. at 47-48.
33. See id. at 48 (“If a firm does become a monopolist, it can be divided into several
smaller firms in order to restore a competitive market.”).
34. Id. at 48-53.
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the monopoly’s behavior and its prices.35
Regulators considered the electricity system a natural monopoly
because the high costs associated with construction of power plants and
transmission and distribution lines made it economically infeasible for
competitors to enter a market where infrastructure already existed.36
Moreover, additional power lines were considered unnecessary; once a
utility had installed its power system, there would be no need for
additional, redundant power lines.37 Therefore, regulators thought it
unlikely that competition in the electricity sector would ever develop.38
Although many have challenged whether electricity remains a natural
monopoly,39 most regulators continue to view the electricity system as a
monopoly requiring comprehensive regulation.40
To prevent abuses from a monopolistic electricity utility, a state
PUC will enter into a regulatory compact with the utility.41 Under this
compact, the utility receives a franchise to provide exclusive service within
a particular geographic area.42 In exchange, the utility must provide service
to all customers within the region and it must agree to cost-of-service
ratemaking regulation by the PUC.43 Through cost-of-service ratemaking,
the PUC allows the utility to earn “just and reasonable” revenues while

35. Id. at 53-54.
36. Id. at 506-508. The electricity system in the United States initially consisted of
dozens of small power stations and hundreds of self-contained power generators located
within various cities. See HOWARD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY (1991) as reprinted in
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 737-43 (describing that when Samuel Insull, a protégé
of Thomas Edison, developed a centralized electricity and transmission system that was able
to produce and transmit electricity over long distances, he became able to out-compete the
smaller, less efficient, localized plants, and once a larger centralized system became
established, economies of scale prohibited other electric companies from establishing their
own competitive systems).
37. Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 506.
38. See id. at 506-07 (noting the connection between natural monopoly and need for
government regulation).
39. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 30, at 51 (“As a result of this combination of
changes in technology and costs, electricity generation is no longer a natural monopoly.”).
40. See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 507 (“[A] proposed price regulation must
first show that the industry exhibits monopolistic tendencies and second that the industry is
affected with a public interest. Electricity clearly satisfies both tests . . . .”).
41. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring), footnoted in Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at
507, n.50. States have jurisdiction over all “retail” electricity sales, while the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has power under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791a-828c (2006), over all interstate wholesale sales of electricity and interstate
transmission. 16 U.S.C. § 824b(1) (2006). Wholesale electricity sales are sales of
electricity to any entity that will then sell the electricity at resale to an end-user. 16 U.S.C. §
824d (2006).
42. Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 507.
43. Id. at 507-08.
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protecting customers from exploitative rates.44 In essence, the overarching
goal for a PUC is to ensure the utility will provide cheap, abundant, and
reliable electricity for ratepayers. As explained below, traditional utility
regulation has encouraged utilities to meet these goals by building large
coal-fired power plants.
A.

Traditional Utility Regulation Favors Large Capital Projects

Historically, traditional utility regulation has incentivized the
construction of capital-intensive power plants and infrastructure. The
“duty to serve” requires utilities to provide electricity to all customers
within the geographic area of the utilities’ franchises.45 This duty means
that utilities must build infrastructure to supply power to customers located
within and beyond city and commercial centers.46 When communities
expand beyond urban boundaries, utilities must expand infrastructure to
provide electrical service.47 As energy demand grows within utilities’
service areas, utilities must obtain more power to serve their customers.48
This typically means that utilities will build new power plants to respond to
increased energy demand by businesses and residential consumers.49
Although utilities may meet this demand by purchasing power from
independent power producers, traditional regulation incentivizes
construction of new power plants by the utilities.50
Traditional ratemaking practices employ a common formula51 to
calculate utilities’ revenues, and this formula creates economic incentives
for utilities to build infrastructure and power plants.52 Under this formula,
utilities may recover from ratepayers their operating expenses – which
include expenditures for labor costs, fuel costs, administrative costs, and
the like – and earn a profit (called a rate of return) on their capital

44. Jersey Cent. Power, 810 F.2d at 1172. See also id. at 1192 (Starr, J., concurring)
(“FERC has already moved somewhat in the direction of balancing competing interests by
permitting recovery of the costs of building the plant in the cost of service.”).
45. Spence, supra note 26, at 419-20.
46. Id.
47. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1251-57
(1998) (discussing the obligation to extend services over time).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1278-79 (discussing the rise of independent power producers as electricity
suppliers).
51. R = Br+O, where R = the utility’s revenue requirement, B = the rate base, r = the
rate of return, and O = operating expenses. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 130.
52. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1059 (1962) (applying the formula to a hypothetical
situation to demonstrate how firms operate in certain markets).
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expenditures (called the rate base) – which include expenses associated
with building new power plants, transmission lines, and other facilities.53
Under this formula, utilities will earn a greater profit if their rate bases –
i.e., their capital expenses – increase.54 The ratemaking formula, therefore,
incentivizes the construction of new power plants because capital projects
provide utilities with a relatively secure way of increasing their rate base.55
B.

Traditional Regulation Favors Coal

While it is clear that traditional utility regulation favors capital
construction, it is not necessarily clear that it would favor coal over other
sources of power.
Nonetheless, traditional utility regulation has
particularly favored the use of coal and incentivized the construction of
coal power plants since World War II.56 Several aspects of traditional
utility regulation have contributed to coal’s dominance. As noted above,
utilities must demonstrate their capital expenditures will provide cheap,
abundant, and reliable electricity.57
Reliable baseload58 electricity
traditionally has come from coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy.59 Of
these sources, only coal has thus far avoided significant economic or
ecological constraints. As a result, coal has remained the dominant source
of U.S. electricity.60
Natural gas currently accounts for a little more than 20 percent of
U.S. electricity production,61 and it has never come close to competing with
53. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 130-31, 36 (noting that in order to stay
functional, firms must recoup operating expenses).
54. See Richard J. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500-01 (1984) (explaining
how electricity demand forecasts in the early 1970s spurred increased construction of new
plants).
55. See id. at 542-43 (discussing incentive effect of various rate treatment schemes).
See also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 130-31 (discussing controversial nature of rate
base determinations).
56. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 228 fig.8.2a (demonstrating the increase
of the net generation of coal since 1950).
57. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168,
1172 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring) (noting rates must be “just and reasonable” to
consumers).
58. Energy Info. Admin., Glossary: B, http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_b.htm
(last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (defining “base load” as “[t]he minimum amount of electric
power delivered or required over a given period of time at a steady rate.”).
59. See id. (defining a base load plant as one “usually housing high-efficiency steamelectric units, which is normally operated to take all or part of the minimum load of a
system, and which consequently produces electricity at an essentially constant rate and runs
continuously.”). Coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants fall within this definition.
60. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 228 fig.8.2a (comparing the net
generation by all sectors).
61. Id.
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coal as a base load source of electricity.62 From the 1930s until the early
1980s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its
predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, regulated natural gas as a
natural monopoly, similar to the way most PUCs regulate electricity now.63
However, unlike the electricity system, the natural gas system always
featured many independent natural gas producers and a competitive
intrastate market.64 FERC’s regulation did not fit with the realities of the
natural gas market, and it both stifled natural gas production and kept
prices artificially high.65 This period coincided with the development of
many of the existing coal-fired power plants in the United States, and high
gas prices prevented natural gas from becoming a financially reliable
source of energy during the 1960s and 1970s.66 Deregulation of the natural
gas market in the 1980s spurred many utilities and, more importantly,
independent power producers to build several more natural gas plants.67
Despite this, natural gas has not become competitive with coal because
natural gas prices track oil prices and are therefore subject to the price
shocks common in the oil industry.68 While some energy experts believe
natural gas could become a more dominant fuel if the United States passes
climate change legislation,69 it has not yet proven competitive with coal.
Nuclear power seemed likely to displace coal as the dominant
source of electricity in the late 1950s and 1960s, when utilities built dozens
of nuclear power plants based on the promise that nuclear power would be
“‘too cheap to meter.’”70 As a result of that construction boom, nuclear
power currently accounts for 20 percent of U.S. electricity production.71
But the costs associated with constructing nuclear power plants were never

62. See id. at 231 tbl.8.2b (showing that every year since 1949, coal has generated
significantly more electricity than natural gas).
63. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 1995, at 53-55 (describing the history and problems of
natural gas regulation).
64. See id. at 54 (stating that the production of gas is “not a natural monopoly”).
65. Id. at 55.
66. See id. at 54 (acknowledging that by the mid 1970s, “gas service was no longer
available to most prospective new customers”).
67. See id. at 84 (stating that “gas is being found, produced, stored, and transported at a
much lower cost than was [previously] the case”).
68. Bosselman, supra note 24, at 13-14.
69. See PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 22 and accompanying text (stating that “natural
gas can serve as a bridge fuel to a low-carbon, sustainable energy future”). But see
Bosselman, supra note 24, at 11-13 (arguing that natural gas may not remain an abundant
source of energy in the near future and that industry experts expect to increase imports of
natural gas as production from domestic gas wells declines).
70. See Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 22728 (2005) (discussing aggressive construction of nuclear power plants during this period).
71. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 228 fig.8.2a.
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competitive with coal,72 and the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island
effectively ensured that no more nuclear plants would come online to
compete with coal during coal’s ascendancy.73
Although some
commentators believe that climate change legislation could revive the
nuclear industry as a source of carbon-free electricity,74 others question
whether nuclear energy will ever become economically competitive or
publicly accepted.75 To date, though, nuclear energy production has
remained a weak competitor, and coal has retained its primacy in the
electricity sector.
Climate change, however, threatens coal’s dominance in the electricity
sector. Although concerns about the direct impacts of coal production and
combustion have never threatened coal’s status before, the projected costs
of carbon have led regulators to reject or restrict new coal plants.76 As the
next section explains, the PUCs may be attempting to prevent a repeat of
the fiascos associated with the build-up and rapid demise of the nuclear
industry.
III. PAYING THE COSTS FOR UNUSED NUCLEAR PLANTS
The rise and fall of the nuclear energy industry include several
interesting parallels to the current situation of the coal-based electricity
sector. Although nuclear energy never gained the market share that coalbased energy currently enjoys, its boom and bust has served as a cautionary
tale for utilities and their regulators. This is not only due to public fears

72. See Tomain, supra note 70, at 229 (noting that the market for nuclear power would
not have been able to operate without government support).
73. See id. at 225 (noting that all plants ordered since 1973 have been canceled and that
no nuclear power plants have come online since 1978).
74. See Bosselman, supra note 24, at 37-52 (discussing relative environmental
advantages of nuclear power). In August 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
stated that it planned to process twenty-three applications to license and build new nuclear
power plants “over the next several years.” U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 2009INFORMATION
DIGEST
43
(2009),
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc2010
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v21/sr1350v21.pdf. At least one commentator views these
new license applications, and the several pending requests for license renewals for existing
nuclear plants, as an indication that the United States is “in the midst of the ‘Second
Coming’ of nuclear power.” Anthony Z. Roisman et al., Regulating Nuclear Power in the
New Millennium (The Role of the Public), 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 317, 317 (2009).
Despite this pronouncement, Roisman and his co-authors view the NRC’s public
participation processes as inadequate and do not believe nuclear power will play an
increased role in providing electricity until the NRC improves the licensing processes. Id. at
363.
75. See Tomain, supra note 70, at 232-46 (noting that prospect of a nuclear-powered
future will depend on public acceptance and relative cost).
76. See infra notes 135-196 and accompanying text.
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regarding the safety of nuclear power plants.77 Rather, the economic costs
associated with nuclear plants which never came online have forced
utilities and PUCs to act with great caution in the face of uncertainty.
A.

Nuclear Power’s Rise and Fall

Nuclear energy in the United States got its start with the passage of
the Atomic Energy Act of 194678 and the creation of the Atomic Energy
Commission.79 Under the 1946 Act, however, only the military could
develop or use nuclear energy, because Congress then believed that nuclear
energy required strict controls.80 By 1954, moods about nuclear power had
changed, and the nuclear power industry successfully lobbied for the
passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.81 The new Atomic Energy Act
encouraged private ownership and commercial development of nuclear
power plants.82 The passage of the Price-Anderson Act of 195783 further
promoted private development of nuclear energy by limiting the liability of
utilities and nuclear reactor manufacturers should a nuclear accident
occur.84 These two laws quickly spurred a boom in nuclear power plant
construction. In total, between 1955 and 1979, the Atomic Energy
Commission issued construction permits to build 177 nuclear generating
units.85 As a result of this boom, nuclear energy accounted for
approximately twenty percent of the nation’s electricity production in
2008.86
However, the boom quickly ended with the accident at Three Mile
Island in 1979, when a nuclear plant’s core reactor malfunctioned and
nearly experienced a complete meltdown.87 That year marked the last one
in which the Atomic Energy Commission or its successor, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, issued a construction permit for a nuclear
facility.88 The accident also exacerbated other problems in the nuclear
power industry. Several plants had incurred cost overruns in which
77. See infra notes 87 and 91 (discussing the Three Mile Island accident).
78. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
79. Tomain, supra note 70, at 226.
80. Id.
81. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954).
82. Tomain, supra note 70, at 227.
83. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
84. Tomain, supra note 70, at 227.
85. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 275 tbl.9.1.
86. Id. at 276 tbl.9.2.
87. See Barry Kellman, Anxiety Over the TMI Accident: An Essay on NEPA's Limits of
Inquiry, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 219, 227-32 (1983) (describing the details of the Three
Mile Island accident).
88. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 275 tbl.9.1.
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construction costs increased two-, three-, and even fivefold over initial cost
estimates.89 In addition, energy forecasts from the 1950s and 1960s proved
inaccurate, and it became clear that utilities no longer needed electricity
from the nuclear plants.90 Ultimately, revised cost estimates and concerns
about plant safety arising from the Three Mile Island accident led to dozens
of plant cancellations and abandonments.91 In some cases, planned
facilities never reached the construction phase; but in others, fully
constructed plants never went online.92 Yet all of the canceled plants
involved significant expenditures of money,93 and the question quickly
turned to who should pay for the costs associated with these useless
facilities.
B.

Who Pays?: Prudent Investment v. Used and Useful

PUCs typically approached the question of who should pay for
canceled plants by employing the “prudent investment” doctrine, the “used
and useful” doctrine,94 or a combination of the two.95 The prudent
investment doctrine allowed a utility to include the costs of a plant in its
rate base so long as the utility’s investment in the plant was prudent at the
time of the decision to invest.96 As noted above, the inclusion of the plant
in the utility’s rate base meant that the utility would earn a rate of return, or
profit, on the plant.97 The used and useful doctrine allowed a utility to
include a plant in its rate base if the plant was “actually used and useful to
the utility in providing regulated services.”98 The hybrid approach, which
most PUCs applied to nuclear plants, allowed a utility to recover the costs
of the plant but typically prohibited the utility from including the costs in
its rate base.99
As the number of canceled nuclear plants grew, some legislatures
passed laws prohibiting utilities from recovering any of their investment in
89. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 324.
90. Pierce, supra note 54, at 498-99.
91. See id. at 498-99 (noting that, in 1984, more than one hundred nuclear plants had
been canceled, many of which would have provided “totally superfluous generating
capacity”).
92. Id. at 497-98.
93. See id. at 498-99 (noting that plant cancelations had already resulted in a loss of ten
billion dollars, and they were expected to yield losses of many more billions).
94. Id. at 511.
95. Id. at 517.
96. Id. at 511.
97. Supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. See also Pierce, supra note 54, at 51112 (showing how the inclusion of a new plant to the ratemaking formula significantly
impacts the rates of return).
98. Pierce, supra note 54, at 512.
99. Id. at 518-19.
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the canceled plants from ratepayers.100 In Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch,101 the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law declaring “‘the
cost of construction or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility
producing . . . electricity shall not be made a part of the rate base nor
otherwise included in the rates charged by the electric utility until such
time as the facility is used and useful in service to the public.’”102 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted this law to prohibit utilities
from recovering any of the costs of the plants in either their rate bases or
through amortization.103 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
utilities’ arguments that the Pennsylvania law resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of the utilities’ property.104 The Court declared the
Pennsylvania law, and others like it, beyond the federal courts’ scope of
review unless utilities could demonstrate that the laws would, by
themselves, bankrupt the utilities.105 As a result of Duquesne, PUCs
retained great authority to decide how to allocate costs for failed
investments in nuclear plants.
C.

The Broader Consequences of Allocating Costs for Failed Facilities

In the end, none of the practices employed by PUCs yielded
immediately satisfactory results. Politically, PUCs were in a no-win
situation because any decision allocating the costs inevitably resulted in
either the utilities or the ratepayers, or both parties, feeling cheated.
Beyond that, as Professor Pierce has explained, each cost allocation
decision necessarily affected the utilities’ future business plans. PUCs that
allowed utilities to include the full costs of the failed plants in their rate
bases penalized ratepayers and signaled to utilities that they could expect to
earn a profit on investment decisions that turned out to be imprudent.106
PUCs that prohibited utilities from recovering from the ratepayers any
investment in the canceled plants sent mixed messages to utilities and
ratepayers. On the one hand, the denial of any recovery incentivized
utilities to under-invest in new power plants so they could avoid exposure
to failed investments at the outset.107 On the other hand, a utility already in
the process of construction would likely continue the project, even if the
100. Id. at 519-20.
101. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
102. Id. at 304 (quoting 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (Supp. 1988)) (omission in original).
103. Id. at 305.
104. Id. at 310-16.
105. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court applied longstanding precedent
which empowers federal courts to review only the “end result” of a PUC’s ratemaking
decision. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
106. Pierce, supra note 54, at 542.
107. Id. at 542-43.
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electricity was no longer required, to avoid the harsh treatment some states
afforded plants that did not go into service.108 While the hybrid approach
some PUCs employed may have mitigated the most extreme consequences
of a strict prudent investment or used and useful test,109 it nonetheless left
utilities, regulators, and ratepayers dissatisfied to some degree.
Beyond that, the rise and fall of the nuclear industry appears to have
had lingering consequences as PUCs struggle to predict how potential
climate change regulation will affect utilities’ investments in new coal
plants. As the next section explains, several utilities have attempted to
invest in new coal-burning technologies that would reduce, and perhaps
eliminate, carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. Yet, as
Part V shows, PUCs appear unwilling to expose ratepayers to the risk that
these technologies, which are expensive and in some cases unproven, will
fail to adequately reduce emissions to the levels Congress may ultimately
demand. Thus, the lasting legacy of the nuclear plant cancellations may
ultimately signal the end of coal’s dominance in the electric sector.
IV. COAL, CARBON DIOXIDE, AND DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGIES
In 2007, coal-fired power plants accounted for eighty-two percent of
all carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector110 and over twentyNot
seven percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.111
surprisingly, these emission levels have made coal-based electricity a
primary target of enacted and proposed laws aimed at reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.112 In response, the coal industry has attempted to develop
108. Id.
109. Id. at 543-44. Professor Pierce argues that a policy allowing for recovery of out-ofpocket costs of an investment in a canceled plant, exclusion of some cost of capital
associated with the failed plant, and a penalty to discourage over-investment could create
the right incentives for future plant investment decisions. Id. at 543. Even so, he
acknowledges that the specific formula to achieve the right incentives is difficult to establish
or employ. Id.
110. Carbon dioxide emissions from stationary power plants that burn fossil fuels for
electricity equaled 2,397.2 teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalents (Tg CO2 Eq.). ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 4, at 3-8, tbl.3-9. Coal-fired power plants accounted for 1,967.6
Tg CO2 Eq., or slightly more than 82 percent, of the total carbon dioxide emissions from the
electricity sector. Id.
111. Total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions equaled 7,150.1 Tg CO2 Eq. Id. at 2-1. Coalfired power plants emitted 1,967.6 Tg CO2 Eq., or 27.5 percent of total greenhouse gas
emissions, in carbon dioxide alone. Id. at 2-18, tbl.2-13. Although coal plants emit other
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide emissions dwarf all other greenhouse gas releases. Id. at
2-7 to 2-8, tbl.2-4 (stationary combustion of fossil fuels emits only 6.6 Tg CO2 Eq. of
methane and 14.7 Tg CO2 Eq. of nitrous oxide).
112. See, e.g., REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(2005), http://rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf (establishing a regional cap-and-trade
program for carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation); REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS

POWERSFINALIZED_THREE

2010]

THE END OF COAL AS “CHEAP” ELECTRICITY

3/31/2010 2:03:02 AM

421

new coal combustion technologies that reduce carbon dioxide emissions or
capture and permanently store carbon dioxide emissions. The obvious
objective of these technologies is to enable the coal industry to maintain its
prominence in the electricity sector. However, the industry’s ability to do
this will depend largely on the willingness of PUCs to allow utilities to
invest in new coal technologies while the scope of climate change
regulation remains unclear.
Typical coal-fired power plants use a standard technology to convert
coal into electricity: they burn coal to create steam, which then drives a
turbine to create electricity.113 Most technological advances in coal-based
electricity have focused on increasing efficiency to burn less coal and thus
emit fewer pollutants.114 For example, early “sub-critical” coal-fired power
plants burned coal to boil water to create the steam.115 Other early
innovations, employing “supercritical” technologies, focused on ways to
increase pressures and temperatures so that more steam could form using
less coal.116 Most existing coal plants use these standard technologies, but
even those that employ “supercritical” coal combustion continue to emit
millions of tons of carbon dioxide each year.117
As concerns about climate change have increased, electric
companies have worked to develop new coal combustion technologies to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The two primary technologies, “ultrasupercritical” technology and integrated gasification combined-cycle
technology, seek to increase the efficiency of coal combustion.118 Coal
plants currently operate at about thirty-five percent efficiency, with the
remaining energy released as waste heat.119 American Electric Power has
INITIATIVE,
MODEL
RULE
(2008),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf; H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong. (2009) (proposing a federal cap-and-trade program); Act of Sept. 29, 2006, 2006 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 598 (establishing a statewide emissions performance standard requiring all
long-term power purchases to come from plants that emit no more than a combined-cycle
gas turbine power plant and thus prohibiting long-term power contracts for coal-powered
electricity).
113. William L. Sigmon, The Lure of Ultra-Supercritical: Exploring the Future of CoalSept.-Oct.
2008,
at
90,
90,
available
at
Burning,
ENERGYBIZ,
http://energycentral.fileburst.com/EnergyBizOnline/2008-5-sep-oct/Tech_Frontier_UltraSupercritical.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 90-91.
117. See id. at 91 (noting that many new coal plants coming online will use supercritical
technology); DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM
THE GENERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 3 tbl.2 (2000),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/co2_report/co2emiss.pdf (noting that coal
plants emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999).
118. Sigmon, supra note 113, at 90.
119. See VELLA A. KUUSKRAA, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, A PROGRAM TO
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developed an ultra-supercritical technology that will use increased
pressures and temperatures to create steam, and theoretically increase the
efficiency by about eleven percent.120 Other companies have invested in
integrated gasification combined-cycle (IGCC) technologies, which first
convert coal into a synthetic gas that is then burned in a combustion
cycle.121 The waste heat from the combustion cycle then heats water to
create steam, which then powers a steam-generated turbine.122 This
combined combustion/steam system has the potential to operate up to
twenty percent more efficiently than traditional coal plants.123 Even with
these efficiency gains, however, coal-based electricity will still account for
millions of tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year.124
A more aggressive technology under development would employ
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology to capture carbon
dioxide emissions from coal plants, pump the carbon dioxide into
underground storage areas, and sequester the carbon dioxide indefinitely.125
Although CCS could theoretically apply to subcritical and supercritical coal
plants, the costs to adapt the plants for CCS would likely be prohibitively
expensive.126 Technologically and economically, it should be easier to
integrate CCS technology into IGCC plants, although the carbon capture

ACCELERATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE (CCS): RATIONALE,
OBJECTIVES, AND COSTS 9 tbl.2 (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/CCSDeployment.pdf (noting that plant efficiencies vary depending upon when the plants came
online). Plants built before 1970 have an average efficiency of twenty-eight percent; those
built between 1970 and 1989 have a thirty-six percent efficiency rate, and those built
between 1990 and 2003 achieve thirty-nine percent efficiency. Id.
120. Sigmon, supra note 113, at 91.
121. DEP’T OF ENERGY, HOW COAL GASIFICATION POWER PLANTS WORK,
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/gasification/howgasificationworks.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See David Biello, How Fast Can Carbon Capture and Storage Fix Climate
AMERICAN,
Apr.
10,
2009,
Change?,
SCIENTIFIC
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-fast-can-carbon-capture-andstorage-fix-climate-change (noting that a single coal-fired power plant using IGCC
technology in West Virginia will emit 8.5 million metric tons of CO2).
125. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
126. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, COST AND PERFORMANCE BASELINE
FOR
FOSSIL
ENERGY
PLANTS
11
(2007),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/energyanalyses/pubs/Bituminous%20Baseline_Final%20Report.pdf [hereinafter NETL COST AND
PERFORMANCE]. See also NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, WHAT ARE THE
COSTS
AND
BENEFITS
OF
CARBON
CAPTURE
AND
SEQUESTRATION?,
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/FAQs/benefits.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2009) [hereinafter NETL COST AND BENEFITS] (explaining results of cost estimates and
demonstrating that CCS applied to pulverized coal plants using sub- and supercritical
technology would increase costs by 70 to 100 percent).
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and sequestration process would use about one-fourth of all electricity
generated from the plant.127 However, the development of commercialscale power plants with CCS technology is in its infancy and has proceeded
to date in fits and starts due to cost concerns and technological
challenges.128 Most notably, the Department of Energy briefly canceled
funding for the FutureGen project, a proposed commercial-scale ICGG
power plant with CCS capacity, when it realized the plant would cost $1.8
billion, about $850 million more than it had anticipated.129 Although the
Department later renewed its support for the FutureGen facility, many other
private investors backed out of the facility’s development due to concerns
about the stability of the project’s funding.130 Other commercial-scale CCS
plants have yet to proceed as far as FutureGen.131 Thus, while ICGG plants
with CCS may provide a way to continue to use coal in a carbonconstrained world, the deployment of the technology appears to be distant.
The electricity sector thus faces a conundrum as it attempts to
respond to climate change. It emits a significant amount of greenhouse
gases, primarily from coal-based power, and existing technologies allow
coal plants to operate more efficiently but do not significantly reduce
overall carbon dioxide emissions. More innovative technologies will
consume about one-quarter of any new plant’s energy and may cost about
$2 billion to deploy.132 Although technologies may become cheaper over
time, coal’s dominance as a “cheap” form of energy may be nearing an end.
At least, it seems that PUCs believe this to be the case. As discussed in the
next section, this belief may in fact make coal’s potential demise a
certainty.

127. NETL COST AND BENEFITS, supra note 126; Trish Choate, Sweetwater Coal Plant
Ready for Cap and Trade Rules, SAN ANGELO STANDARD TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009 (noting that
proposed CCS facility would use about twenty-five percent of power plant’s electricity),
available at http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/mar/30/sweetwater-coal-plant-readyfor-cap-and-trade/.
128. See Matthew L. Wald, Refitted to Bury Emissions, Plant Draws Attention, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at A1 (discussing the difficulties with implementing CCS
technologies).
129. Martin LaMonica, DOE Scraps FutureGen “Clean Coal” Project for New Tack,
CNET NEWS, Jan. 30, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-9861473-54.html.
130. Sonal Patel, Revived FutureGen Faces Renewed Funding Obstacles, POWER, Aug.
1, 2009, http://www.powermag.com/coal/Revived-FutureGen-Faces-Renewed-FundingObstacles_2077.html.
131. See Wald, supra note 128 (discussing other efforts to develop CCS facilities).
132. See Choate, supra note 127 (discussing the energy used to capture and compress
carbon dioxide at a proposed plant); LaMonica, supra note 129 (discussing the $1.8 billion
estimated cost of a proposed FutureGen project).
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APPLYING TRADITIONAL ELECTRICITY REGULATION TO NEW COAL
PLANTS IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Although traditional electricity regulation has favored the use of
coal thus far, the costs associated with climate change, combined with the
electricity sector’s experiences with nuclear energy, make it likely that coal
will lose its dominance within the electricity sector. Even if Congress fails
to pass climate change legislation within the immediate future, or enacts a
mediocre law that requires very few reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions in the short-term, the specter of climate change legislation will
likely be enough to discourage construction of new coal plants. A handful
of PUCs across the country have already rejected proposals for new coal
plants because they expect climate change legislation will impose
significant carbon costs on utilities and their ratepayers.133 Other PUCs
have rejected coal plants proposing to use innovative technology, like
IGCC and carbon capture and sequestration, due to concerns regarding the
expense and uncertainty involved in deploying new technologies.134
Combined, these cases reveal an increasing wariness on the part of PUCs to
allow construction of new coal plants.
A.

The PacifiCorp Projects

Oregon was perhaps the first state to reject a utility’s proposal to
build new coal plants due, in part, to concerns about pending climate
legislation.135 In Oregon, utilities must prepare integrated resource plans
(IRPs), which serve as long-range planning documents.136 IRPs identify
existing energy resources and propose an overall resource portfolio
designed to achieve low costs and limit ratepayers’ risks.137 Once a utility

133. See infra notes 135-169 and accompanying text; see also Robert L. Glicksman,
Coal-Fired Power Plants, Greenhouse Gases, and State Statutory Substantial
Endangerment Provisions: Climate Change Comes to Kansas, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 517,
538-52 (2008) (discussing various state denials of proposed new coal plants).
134. See infra notes 170-196 and accompanying text; see also Glicksman, supra note
133, at 546-47 (discussing North Carolina’s “go-slow” approach regarding IGCC
technology).
135. See In re PacifiCorp, 2007 WL 299389 (Or. P.U.C. Jan. 16, 2007) (denying
approval of PacifiCorp’s draft RFP).
136. In re Integrated Resource Planning, 255 P.U.R.4th 367, 385 (Or. P.U.C. Jan. 8,
2007); see also Sandra L. Hirotsu, Remembering the Bottom Line: Why the Oregon Public
Utility Commission’s Obligation to Protect Utility Ratepayers Requires Saying No to Coal
14-15 (Apr. 24, 2008) (unpublished comment, on file with the author) (describing the IRP
process).
137. In re Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n., 2007 WL 534555 (Or. P.U.C. Feb. 9, 2007)
(describing the rule for investigations into Integrated Resource Planning); Hirotsu, supra
note 136, at 14.
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develops an IRP, it must then present the IRP to the Oregon PUC for
“acknowledgement.”138 If the PUC acknowledges a utility’s plan to build
new electricity generation plants, this acknowledgement provides support
for a utility when it seeks to include the costs of the plant in its rate base.139
In contrast, if a PUC denies all or part of an IRP, the utility will have a
more difficult time receiving authorization to build a power plant or
recover the costs of the plant in its rate base.140
PacifiCorp is a utility regulated by the Oregon PUC. In 2004, the
Oregon PUC acknowledged in part an IRP prepared by PacifiCorp;
however, the Oregon PUC declined to acknowledge PacifiCorp’s stated
need for two large power plants for the eastern side of its service area.141 In
its denial, the Oregon PUC concluded that PacifiCorp had failed to
demonstrate an adequate need for the additional power plants and advised
PacifiCorp to “delay a commitment to coal until IGCC technology is
further commercialized.”142 Rather than wait, PacifiCorp filed an updated
IRP claiming a need for one base load power plant.143 Before the Oregon
PUC had the opportunity to review or acknowledge the updated IRP,
PacifiCorp submitted a draft “Request for Proposals,” seeking authorization
to solicit bids to construct new coal power plants.144
In 2007, the Oregon PUC rejected PacifiCorp’s request. First, the
PUC held that PacifiCorp had not demonstrated a need for two large power
plants.145 Second, to the extent PacifiCorp had demonstrated some need for
additional electricity, it had shown a need for peaking power.146 The
Oregon PUC found large base load plants inappropriate to fill peak power
demand, particularly since large plants could limit the utility’s ability to
respond to “uncertainties related to technology change and regulation of
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.”147 Third, the PUC concluded that
PacifiCorp’s construction of large coal-fired power plants would likely
expose the utility to significant cost risks due to recent greenhouse gas
emissions legislation passed by California.148 California had established an
emissions performance standard prohibiting utilities in California from
entering into long-term contracts to purchase power from any power plants

138.
15.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Integrated Resource Planning, 255 P.U.R.4th at 370; Hirotsu, supra note 136, at 14Hirotsu, supra note 136, at 15.
Id.
PacifiCorp, 2007 WL 299389, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6-7.
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whose greenhouse gas emissions rates exceeded the emissions rates of a
combined-cycle gas turbine power plant (i.e., a natural gas plant).149
PacifiCorp’s proposed coal-fired power plants would not have met the
California standards, and, therefore, the Oregon PUC considered
PacifiCorp’s intention to sell electricity to California unduly risky.150 In
short, based on the uncertain prospects of future climate change legislation
and the certain risks associated with California’s emissions performance
standards, the Oregon PUC rejected PacifiCorp’s proposal to build new
coal plants.
The Oregon PUC also discussed, but did not decide, how PacifiCorp
should factor the costs of climate change into its proposal.151 PacifiCorp
had estimated that carbon costs would add eight dollars per ton of CO2 to
its projected costs, while other parties argued the costs should range from
$8.50 per ton to $30.80 per ton.152 Based on the potential costs, the Oregon
Department of Energy concluded that PacifiCorp should be allowed to
build only IGCC plants with carbon sequestration, if it were to build any
coal plants at all.153 Although the Oregon PUC did not adopt the
Department of Energy’s recommendation, it made it clear that carbon
dioxide costs would become a significant factor in future decisions.
B.

The Turk Plant

In 2007, Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) filed
an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN)154 with
the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Texas PUC) to build a 600Megawatt ultra-supercritical coal-fired power plant.155 Although the Texas
PUC found that SWEPCO demonstrated a need for the plant,156 it
149. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340 (2008).
150. In re PacifiCorp, 2009 WL 299389 at *7 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2007).
151. Id. at *9-10.
152. Id. at *9.
153. Id.
154. Most states require utilities to obtain pre-approval to construct new plants from
PUCs. The approval is often issued as a certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN),
which certifies that the plant is necessary to meet projected power needs and in the public
interest. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 62.
155. Order Conditionally Approving Application of Sw. Elec. Power Co. for a Coal
Fired Power Plant in Ark. at 10 ¶ 1, PUC Docket No. 33891, SOAH Docket No. 473-071929, (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 12, 2008) [hereinafter SWEPCO].
156. Id. at 3-4. The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially recommended denial of the
CCN because he did not believe SWEPCO had adequately demonstrated a need for
additional electricity to serve its ratepayers. Id. at 2. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that
SWEPCO had improperly included wholesale power – power SWEPCO would generate and
then sell to a non-regulated entity for resale – in its forecasts of energy needs. Id. The ALJ
believed SWEPCO could only consider the needs of its regulated customers when
forecasting future energy requirements. Id. The Texas PUC, however, held that SWEPCO
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nonetheless restricted SWEPCO’s ability to recover future carbon
mitigation costs from ratepayers.157 The Texas PUC noted that estimated
costs for CO2 emissions could range from $13 per ton to $70 per ton, and
average CO2 costs would range between $30 to $45 per ton, depending
upon the number of allowances available during the early phase of any capand-trade program and the availability of carbon capture and sequestration
in the future.158 After recognizing the significant degree of uncertainty
regarding the potential costs, the Texas PUC limited SWEPCO’s ability to
pass carbon mitigation costs onto consumers by declaring that any
mitigation costs that exceed $28 per ton through the year 2030 “shall not be
borne by Texas ratepayers.”159
Although the Texas PUC’s decision represents a moderate response
to uncertainty regarding carbon regulation, it nonetheless signals an
important shift within PUCs regarding climate change. The Texas PUC
recognized the likelihood of future carbon regulation and sought to protect
ratepayers from exposure to future costs. In so doing, the Texas PUC put
the utility and its investors on notice that they would bear responsibility for
unanticipated costs. At the same time, the decision raises several important
questions, including who will pay carbon mitigation costs after the year
2030. This lingering uncertainty regarding future carbon costs may require
utilities to proceed with even greater caution as they decide whether to
invest in new coal plants.
C.

The WP&L Plants

The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (Wisconsin PSC) is
perhaps the first PUC that based its denial of a CCN squarely on costs
associated with carbon mitigation. Wisconsin Power and Light Company
(WP&L) sought a CCN authorizing construction of a 300-Megawatt power
plant using coal as its primary fuel.160 WP&L presented the Wisconsin
PSC with two options, both of which would employ traditional coalburning technology to produce electricity.161 WP&L’s initial cost estimates
for the projects ranged from $777 million to $795 million.162 Within nine
could include wholesale power sales in its needs forecast. Id.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id. It is unclear what timeframe applies to these estimates. Id.
159. Id.
160. Final Decision Denying Application of Wis. Power and Light Co., d/b/a Alliant
Energy, for Auth. to Construct a New Coal-Fired Plant in Wis., No. 6680-CE-170 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter WP&L].
161. Id. at 1. One plant would employ a “circulating fluidized bed boiler” that could
burn coal, pet coke, and biomass, while the other would use a subcritical pulverized coal
boiler to burn coal and up to four percent biomass. Id. at 1-2.
162. Id. at 2.
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months, WP&L’s cost projections had climbed to between $1.26 billion
and $1.283 billion, representing a 62 percent increase over the initial cost
estimates.163 Based on the revised figures, the Wisconsin PSC determined
that the WP&L plant, if built, would be “the most expensive conventional
coal plant of its size . . . ever proposed in the United States.”164 With this
statistic in mind, it is not surprising that the Wisconsin PSC denied
WP&L’s requested CCN. However, the Wisconsin PSC’s cost analysis did
represent a significant change in its historical approach to calculating
electricity costs.
The Wisconsin PSC’s cost determinations hinged on its inclusion of
greenhouse gas mitigation expenses in the plant’s cost estimates.165 WP&L
had argued that the PSC could not include greenhouse gas emissions in its
consideration of the application for the CCN because a state statute
prohibited the PSC from considering “the impact of air pollution” in
deciding whether a proposed facility will meet the public interest
requirement for a CCN.166 The PSC, however, concluded that it could
consider monetization of greenhouse gases in its cost assessment of the
proposed plant.167 The Wisconsin PSC then determined that, if greenhouse
gas monetization were factored into the plant’s cost, the expenses would
increase between $551 million and $817 million.168 Based on these
anticipated costs, which would have made the plant “the most expensive
conventional coal plant of its size,” the Wisconsin PSC found the projects
contrary to the public interest.169
The Wisconsin PSC also briefly entertained WP&L’s suggestions
that it could increase the value of the plants by retrofitting them for future
carbon capture and sequestration technology.170 The PSC found the
technology for carbon capture and sequestration “so experimental and so
far from commercial viability” that it refused to consider the proposed plant
modifications as money-saving measures.171 Indeed, the PSC speculated
that carbon capture and sequestration would probably increase the costs of
the plants significantly.172
The Wisconsin decision may signal a new wariness on behalf of
PUCs regarding the traditional claim that coal-fired power plants can
deliver cheap power. Although the Wisconsin PSC recognized that the
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 9 (citing Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)3 (2002)).
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 3, 13.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
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utility needed to add base load power to its energy generating resources,173
it refused to allow coal plants to fulfill this need. And it based its refusal
almost entirely on the added costs that carbon regulation will impose on
power plants. As discussed in greater detail below, this case could
represent a new future for energy policy as PUCs attempt to protect
ratepayers from exposure to uncontrolled costs that climate change
legislation may impose.
D.

The Mesaba Project

While the other PUC decisions demonstrate regulators’ increasing
reluctance to allow new coal plants to go online due to projected carbon
costs, a Minnesota PUC decision reveals a reluctance to expose ratepayers
to uncertain costs of carbon mitigation technologies. In 2005, Excelsior
Energy, Inc. (Excelsior) sought preliminary approval to begin construction
of an IGCC coal plant, known as the Mesaba Project, in Minnesota.174 The
Minnesota legislature had passed a law in 2003 that provided several
incentives for construction of IGCC facilities in the state, including
exemptions from parts of the state PUC approval process for new power
plants.175 One of the most important incentives would guarantee that the
regulated utility in Minnesota, Xcel Energy, would enter into a long-term
power purchase agreement (PPA) committing to buy 450 Megawatts of
power from the Excelsior site.176 However, Excelsior required the
Minnesota PUC’s approval of the PPA and other preliminary authorizations
before it could begin constructing the facility.177 The Minnesota PUC
refused to give Excelsior the authorizations it needed because the Excelsior
plan would have exposed ratepayers to unacceptable risks.
Before seeking the Minnesota PUC’s approval, Excelsior attempted
to negotiate a mutually agreeable PPA with Xcel.178 When these
negotiations failed, Excelsior filed a petition with the Minnesota PUC,
asking it to approve, amend, or modify its proposed PPA and to order Xcel
to buy 13 percent of its retail energy from Excelsior’s Mesaba Project.179

173. Id. at 4-5.
174. Order Disapproving Petition by Excelsior Energy, Inc., for Approval of a Power
Purchase Agreement under Minn. Stat. § 216B.1694, Docket No. E.-6472/M-05-1993 at 3-4
(Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Excelsior].
175. Id. at 1-2.
176. Id. at 1.
177. Id. at 1-2. Among the other requirements, Excelsior required a finding from the
Minnesota PUC that the IGCC was a “least cost resource” under state law and sought an
order directing Xcel to buy 13 percent of the power it needed for its retail customers from
Excelsior. Id. at 4.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id.

POWERSFINALIZED_THREE

430

3/31/2010 2:03:02 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:2

Administrative law judges (ALJs) assigned to review the petition
concluded that the costs in the PPA were unreasonable.180 Moreover, the
ALJs concluded that the actual costs of the Mesaba Project were so high
that it was unlikely Excelsior could develop any PPA with reasonable
prices.181 Excelsior appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Minnesota PUC.
After acknowledging that both state and federal lawmakers “clearly
consider IGCC technology – and this project – sufficiently promising,” the
Minnesota PUC rejected Excelsior’s requests for approval of the power
purchase agreement because it found the terms of the proposed PPA would
be contrary to the public interest and would expose Xcel Energy and its
ratepayers to unreasonably high rates and risks.182 The Minnesota PUC
explained that it would review the PPA based on its traditional regulatory
criteria requiring it “ensure that retail consumers receive adequate and
reliable service at reasonable rates, consistent with the financial
requirements of public utilities and their need to build generating facilities”
or otherwise secure adequate energy supplies.183 The PUC could approve
the PPA only if it met the traditional public interest criteria, which required
it to protect ratepayers from the operational and financial risks of the
project and to ensure the PPA would ensure Xcel’s financial health.184
The Minnesota PUC first concluded that the PPA exposed Xcel and
its ratepayers to unreasonably high prices and rates.185 Rather than setting
fixed prices for power purchased from the Mesaba Project, the PPA
proposed to tie Xcel’s power prices to the costs of building and operating
the Mesaba Project, including any costs associated with installing carbon
capture and sequestration technology.186 The Commission determined that
the Mesaba Project’s costs, excluding carbon capture and sequestration,
would be around $1.9 billion187 – 30 percent higher than other proposed
new coal plants.188 Adding carbon capture and sequestration would
increase the costs by more than one billion dollars and reduce the plant’s
efficiency by about ten percent.189 Based on these projections, and the lack
of any cap on the ultimate costs Xcel might pay, the Minnesota PUC found
the proposed PPA inconsistent with the public interest because it “would
result in unreasonably high prices for Xcel and unreasonably high rates for

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 4, 13-23.
Id. at 13-14 (citing Minn. Stat. § 216B.01 (2003)).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 15.
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Xcel’s ratepayers.”190 The PUC did not rule out the possibility that
Excelsior and Xcel could negotiate a contract setting reasonable rates,191
but the costs of CCS technology make successful negotiations unlikely.
Although costs associated with the Mesaba Project served as the
main reason for the Minnesota PUC’s rejection of the PPA, the PUC also
found that the PPA exposed Xcel and its customers to unreasonable
operational and financial risks. The PPA would have required Excelsior to
pay for more than $75 million worth of replacement power if the Mesaba
Project were to experience breakdowns, shutdowns, or other operational
problems.192 Seventy-five million dollars would cover only about one
year’s expense for replacement power, while the PPA would extend for 25
years.193 The Minnesota PUC concluded that this provision had the effect
of shifting “nearly all the risk” of breakdown and shutdown onto the
ratepayers, and thus found the term to be contrary to the public’s interest.194
The PUC also rejected as unreasonable the PPA’s proposal to place all of
the financial risks associated with engineering, contracting, and
constructing the Mesaba Project on Xcel and its ratepayers.195
Ultimately, the Minnesota PUC ordered Excelsior and Xcel to
resume negotiations to see if they could reach agreement regarding the
terms of a PPA.196 It is unclear, however, if these negotiations will resolve
the significant disputes at issue in the petition proceedings. The disputes
revolved around who should bear the risks for potential cost increases and
operational failures associated with installing new technology. Excelsior
appeared unwilling to expose itself to these risks, and it sought to use the
PPA to push the risks onto the regulated utility, Xcel. The Minnesota PUC,
however, made clear that Xcel and its ratepayers would not bear the risks
of the expensive and unproven IGCC technology. With $1.9 billion – at a
minimum – at stake, it may be the case that neither Excelsior nor Xcel has
the stomach to assume the risks of new coal technology.
VI. COAL PLANT DENIALS AND THE RISE OF RENEWABLES?
Regulators’ reluctance to permit new coal plants suggests that coal
may not retain its status as the dominant source of electricity for much
longer. The uncertainty surrounding the passage and contents of national
climate change legislation197 increases the risk that ratepayers could end up
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17, 23.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Climate Change Bill May Drift: A Wary Senate Might Not
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paying for carbon costs if PUCs approve new coal plants. To avoid this
risk, PUCs have approached new coal plants with great caution, likely in an
effort to avoid repeating the mistakes associated with the rise and fall of the
nuclear power industry. Indeed, the mishaps with the nuclear energy
industry continue to resonate today, since many ratepayers continue to pay
for canceled or abandoned nuclear power plants from which they never
received any electricity.198 So long as carbon costs remain uncertain199 and
CCS technologies remain unproven, it is likely that PUCs will continue to
treat new coal plant proposals with skepticism. Since it is very likely that
uncertainties regarding climate change mitigation will perpetuate for the
foreseeable future, new coal proposals will face more denials.200
As PUCs reject more new coal plant proposals, the question that
arises is: what new energy sources will come online? Three major
Decide Measure’s Fate Until Next Year, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 26, 2009, at Business 1
(recognizing that a new climate change law may take longer to pass than previously
expected due to other domestic issues taking priority).
198. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Nuclear Nonsense: Why
Nuclear Power is no Answer to Climate Change and the World’s Post-Kyoto Energy
Challenges, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 27 (2008) (noting the energy
consumers in the Pacific Northwest continue to pay for canceled nuclear plants).
199. Costs of carbon dioxide will be difficult to predict even if Congress passes national
climate change legislation. For example, cost estimates of the recently passed House bill,
the American Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), vary widely depending upon
how regulated entities will respond to certain incentives in the bill. The bill would, if
enacted, establish a cap-and-trade system that sets caps on the total allowable emissions and
lowers that cap over time, distribute emissions allowances to facilities covered under the
cap, and allow companies to trade emissions allowances in an effort to meet their emissions
requirements. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 2454, AMERICAN
CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 4-5 (2009). It would initially distribute more
than 70 percent of the emissions allowances for free, but by 2031, it would require regulated
entities to purchase, through an auction, about 70 percent of available allowances. Id. at 6.
It would also allow covered entities to use “offsets,” or credits produced through emissions
reductions of uncovered entities, in lieu of up to two billion GHG allowances each year. Id.
at 16.
The Congressional Budget Office prepared an economic analysis of the bill, in which it
estimated that the cap-and-trade requirement “would amount to tens of billions of dollars
annually for private-sector entities and about $1 billion annually for public entities.” Id. at
35. Yet, it also repeatedly noted that it could not provide a cost estimate for various
requirements under the proposed bill. Id. at 36-37. Since the actual costs will depend,
among other things, on the number of offsets covered entities use and the degree to which
covered entities can reduce their own emissions, cost estimates will necessarily remain
speculative. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R.
2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at vii (2009) (“While the
ceiling on offset use is clear, their actual use is an open question.”).
200. See Cassandra Sweet, Otter Tail Unit Scraps Plans for South Dakota Coal Plant,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090911-712041.html
(reporting that a Minnesota utility recently withdrew from its sponsorship of a South Dakota
coal plant due to concerns about finances and uncertainty regarding climate change
legislation).
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categories of sources could serve as likely substitutes: natural gas, nuclear
energy, and renewable sources including hydropower, wind, solar, and
wave.
In the short term, it seems likely that natural gas will serve as a good
“bridge” fuel as the electricity sector adjusts to the decline of coal.201
Natural gas plants are relatively inexpensive to build, and they can turn on
and off quickly to respond to peak energy needs.202 In addition, natural gas
power plants emit about one-half of the carbon dioxide that coal plants emit
and will therefore serve as an acceptable transitional energy source in a
carbon-constrained world.203 However, as mentioned above, natural gas
prices are extremely volatile and will likely become even more volatile as
more countries increase their use of natural gas.204 Therefore, while natural
gas will ease the transition away from traditional coal, it will likely not
become a dominant energy source for the future.
The fate of nuclear energy remains unclear. Despite claims of a
nuclear renaissance and efforts of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to develop more incentives for nuclear power, nuclear
plant construction costs remain prohibitively high.205 As Professor Tomain
has argued, nuclear energy seems unlikely to ever be competitive on its
own, and it will require continued subsidies, liability waivers, and tax
breaks for it to gain more market share within the electricity sector.206
Even if Congress continues to support the nuclear industry with these
incentives – as it seems likely to do – the nuclear industry will still need to
address other unresolved problems, including the public perception that
nuclear energy is unsafe and uncertainty about waste disposal.207 Even
then, utilities seeking to build new plants will need to convince PUCs to
authorize the construction. After the experience with nuclear plants in the
1970s and 1980s, and the de facto moratorium on new plant development
since 1979, utilities may have a difficult time making the case for more
201. PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 22; see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2009, 72 (2009) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009], available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2009).pdf (showing that the amount of coal-fired
plants to be added between 2009 and 2025 will continue to decrease each year).
202. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 72.
203. PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 22, at 1.
204. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 72 (noting that high oil prices
may lead to fewer natural gas plants due to price increases); see also supra note 23 and
accompanying text (describing the positive correlation between natural gas and oil prices
and indicating the volatility of the price of both fuels).
205. See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 198, at 28-29 (providing estimates that nuclear
plants will cost between $8 billion and $14 billion each to construct); ANNUAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 73 (noting that new nuclear plants will not be economical
during a period of low economic growth).
206. Tomain, supra note 70, at 238-43.
207. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 198, at 35-38.
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nuclear facilities.208
This leaves renewable energy sources, which have their own flaws
but also great potential. Indeed, if PUCs continue to reject new coal plants
and resist new nuclear facilities, a window of opportunity could open for
renewable energy sources to finally enable them to compete on a fairer
level with coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy.
Thus far, most utilities have either sought to employ relatively
discrete policies, such as net metering laws,209 to incentivize limited, smallscale construction of renewable energy sources by private land owners or to
build their own larger base load plants in relatively remote areas of the
country.210 The first strategy, promotion of small-scale distributed
generation, is good but has limited potential because it relies on home and
building owners to purchase and install their own renewable energy
systems.211 The second strategy similarly has promise, but licensing
procedures and efforts to connect remote wind and solar farms to the
interstate transmission grid are time-consuming and costly.212 In addition,
large solar installations have been proposed in sensitive desert habitats,213
and it will likely take a considerable period of time for these large arrays to

208. See Progress Energy Takes Turn Before the PSC, THE JACKSONVILLE OBSERVER,
Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.jaxobserver.com/2009/09/23/progress-energy-takes-turn-beforethe-psc/ (describing the likely hurdles a Florida utility will face in order to receive a $500
million rate increase necessary to fund investment in a proposed nuclear power plant).
209. Net metering laws repay consumers for any electricity they produce from their own,
usually small-scale, renewable energy sources. See Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The
Algorithm of Carbon and International Development, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 510, 540
(2008) (describing how under net metering systems, customers exchange power they
produce and sell with power that they take from the utility).
210. See Joseph Romm, Biggest CA Utility Contracts for World’s Biggest Solar Deal –
1300
MW
Solar
Thermal,
ClimateProgress.org,
Feb.
11,
2009,
http://climateprogress.org/2009/02/11/southern-california-edison-sce-brightsource-biggestcsp-concentrated-solar-thermal-power/ (examining a new solar power contract between
Southern California Edison and BrightSource Energy, Inc., which will create new solar
power plants totaling 1,300 megawatts of concentrated solar-thermal power).
211. See Craig Morris & Nathan Hopkins, Home-Grown Juice, WORLD WATCH, MayJune 2008, at 20, 23-24 (arguing that feed-in-tariffs, which guarantee small-scale energy
producers a rate of return above the cost of energy production, would better serve the
renewable energy market).
212. See Kelsey Jae Nunez, Gridlock on the Road to Renewable Energy Development: A
Discussion about the Opportunities & Risks Presented by the Modernization Requirements
of the Electricity Transmission Network, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 137 (2007)
(recognizing that while the United States strongly needs to develop more sources of
renewable and clean energy, it will be very costly and that utilities, taxpayers who are
energy-users, and power generators all need to bear the costs of the upgrade).
213. See Colin Sullivan, RFK Jr., Enviros Clash Over Mojave Solar Proposal, NY
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/09/08/08greenwire-rfk-jrenviros-clash-over-mojave-solar-proposa-98645.html (examining a dispute in California
over the proposed building of large solar-thermal power plants in the Mojave Desert).
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come on line, if they ever do.214 Finally, subsidies awarded to the fossil
fuel industries outnumber subsidies to the renewable energy sector by
orders of magnitude.215 This disparity has delayed some technological
improvements in the renewable energy sector and kept it from gaining a
more significant market share.216
However, a decline in coal may open new opportunities for the
renewable energy sector and create new incentives for regulated utilities to
invest in renewable energy. The traditional electricity regulatory model
already provides some of these incentives, since it allows utilities to profit
from their capital investments.217 If utilities know that they will no longer
receive approval for new coal plants, they may seek to increase their profits
by turning to renewable energy sources. And unlike the case with nuclear
plants, construction costs for most renewable energy sources are
comparatively low and thus not likely to face the same opposition as
nuclear energy.218 The traditional electricity regulatory model could also
spur utilities to build their own forms of distributed generation and recover
the costs of construction and installation in their rate base. For example, in
urban areas, instead of encouraging ratepayers to install privately owned
photovoltaic cells on their roofs, utilities could perform the installation and
retain ownership of the solar array, while providing the ratepayer a
discounted electricity rate in exchange for allowing the utility to site the
solar array on the ratepayer’s roof.219 If the utility could recover expenses
214. See Bureau of Land Management, BLM Initiates Environmental Analysis of Solar
Energy
Development
(May
29,
2008,
updated
June
12,
2008),
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2008/may_08/NR_053008.html (announcing a
process for developing an Environmental Impact Statement for 125 proposals to build solar
energy on public lands).
215. See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax
Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 43 (2006) (acknowledging that while over the past 30 years Congress has enacted
subsidies through tax incentives to encourage the development of renewable energy,
historically the fossil fuel industry has been the only recipient of these incentives).
216. Id. at 74-75.
217. See supra notes 50 to 53 and accompanying text.
218. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 74-75. Indeed, the Energy
Information Administration predicts growth in the renewable energy industry even if
construction costs remain high. Id. at 75.
219. Companies in the United States already rent solar arrays to homeowners in various
states. Alano Herro, U.S. Homeowners Can Now “Rent” Solar Panels, Saving Money,
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4828. The
companies can take advantage of net metering laws and thus earn money both through rental
income and any repayment the customer would receive under the net metering laws.
Utilities arguably lose out under these net metering and rental agreements, because they
cannot profit from the solar investment. See Posting of Jennifer Kho, Rooftop Solar Setback
in California, to Green Inc., Energy, the Environment and the Bottom Line, NY Times.com,
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/rooftop-solar-setback-in-california/ (Sept. 18,
2009, 09:17) (discussing utility company opposition to net metering of homeowner solar
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associated with the installation and construction of the infrastructure
necessary to implement the distributed generation system, it would have
ample incentives to revolutionize the electricity system. Because the
technology to develop distributed generation already exists,220 utilities
could undertake the process almost immediately. As electricity storage and
other renewable energy generation technologies improve, the utility could
make upgrades to its system where necessary. In the near term, distributed
generation and energy conservation efforts could supply adequate
electricity to replace any lost electricity from rejected coal plants.221 In the
more distant future, as renewable energy technologies advance, renewable
energy sources could begin to replace existing coal plants and augur a
transition to a clean energy economy.222
While these ideas may seem overly optimistic, there is little reason
why they cannot become reality.223 For the past seventy or so years, the
abundance, reliability, and, above all, cheapness of coal has allowed it to
dominate over all other electricity sources. Now that PUCs have begun to
reject the idea that coal is cheap, it may well be time for renewable energy
sources to dominate the electricity sector.

power). However, if utilities owned the solar arrays, they could arguably recover the cost of
purchasing the solar arrays in their rate base while incentivizing installation of the panels
through net metering laws or other incentives.
220. See Herro, supra note 219 (discussing solar arrays); see also Sovacool & Cooper,
supra note 198, at 103-04 (discussing available technologies).
221. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1192 (2009) (noting that
energy conservation could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 60 percent in the near-term);
see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1699-1703 (2007) (explaining that 37 percent of individual
emissions result from appliance use and identifying easy measures to reduce energy
consumption).
222. See ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 74-75 (describing a
scenario where renewable energy costs continue to decline, resulting in rapid capacity
growth).
223. The specific strategies necessary to develop a robust distributed generation system
that utilities would embrace are beyond the scope of this article. In a different article, I
intend to examine why utilities have not yet invested significantly in distributed generation.
That article will also explore whether new energy legislation and potential climate change
regulation will provide utilities with incentives to pursue distributed generation over largescale renewable energy projects. While these policy questions merit much more review, it is
nonetheless fair to say that distributed generation provides many opportunities for utilities to
transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy sources.

